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Rome and Parthia: 
Power Politics and Diplomacy Across Cultural Frontiers 
  
By Dr R. James Ferguson 
  
Parthians and Persians: The Horizon of Hellenistic and Roman Power 
Modern international relations, though still focused in part on issues of power and power balance, has
in recent years been forced to assess a wide range of religious, economic and cultural factors that
cross boundaries and form deep linkages among social systems that are transnational in nature.(1)
This problem is prominent where national or imperial frontiers expand across areas still linked by
trade, religious affiliation, and migration flows, and where the patterns of diplomacy and war
themselves form transboundary linkages. Such frontiers were enduring problems that focused the
attentions of major civilisations for centuries, e.g. China with its complex frontier-relations to the 
west and north-west (followed by a sense of vulnerably to European naval power from the south-east, 
at first via the South China Sea), Russia's historical obsession with an expanding eastern frontier, and
European concern about the power, influence and later instability of the Ottoman Empire. This
problem was also found in the Graeco-Roman world, whose interaction with Persia formed one of the
great 'east-west' dichotomies in European thought. If not exactly 'transnational', since modern nation-
states had not yet been formed, such 'trans-imperial' patterns complicated the creation of stable
borders, undermined power-balancing, and reduced the mutual acceptance of zones for cultural and
religious interaction. Indeed, it seems likely that 'notions of state, territory and boundary' had
developed to a substantial degree in Imperial Rome and Sasanid Persia, shaping complex regional
interactions during both war and peace.(2) 
Persia and Parthia were two of the great 'others' that shaped the limits of the Graeco-Roman world,(3) 
and were also imagined worlds where European values were explored, excluded, and projected.
'Persia' invokes a thousand images derived from school textbooks and old movies, most often the
image of a huge, slave-based empire that sought to crush the freedom of Athens and the bravery of
Sparta. A corrupt despotism that was overthrown by the heroic (if murderous) Alexander the Great. A
medieval court replete with viziers and the pomp and ceremony of the east. A declining power
engaged with Russia and England in the Great Game of imperial competition and espionage.(4) More
recently, a vital region for later European diplomatic, energy and security interests, including a role in
the new 'Great Game' based on access to oil and gas, both in the Persian Gulf area and the Caspian
Sea.(5)  
'Parthia' invokes much less: usually a null result from many public databases and one or two dated
books in local library catalogues. With the exception of academic writing, mainly on the 'Roman east',
the memory of this extended empire in the English speaking world is usually encapsulated in one
vaguely remembered phrase: 'the Parthian shot', the surprise tactic that the fleeing horse-archer makes 
when he turns and shoots back over his shoulder against an over-confident pursuer.(6) More generally 
it suggests a strategic retreat followed by a devastating counter-attack. We might replace these images 
with two themes: Parthian power and Persian elegance. Parthia emerged both as the inheritor of early
Middle Eastern influences and as the limit of Roman power in the east. It was a strategic and cultural
counterbalance whose significance has been underestimated in the Graeco-Roman-centric tendencies 
of European historiography.  
There has been a tendency by modern academics to view Parthia and Rome during the mid-first 
century B.C. as emerging superpowers: -  
Thus, with power, prestige, wealth - and hurt pride it was a new Iran that faced Rome. Two brand 
new superpowers flexing their outward muscles, one claiming the mantle of Alexander, the other
the mantle of Cyrus, both meeting face-to-face at the Euphrates which formed their border.(7)  
Under pressure even the Romans might pessimistically view the Parthians as a power 'rivalling
imperial Rome itself'.(8) Indeed, the 'Parthian empire was the only other highly organized political
system known to the Romans, and the Parthians came to be viewed as archetypal "rivals" of the
Romans'.(9) From this perspective, their long conflict might be seen as necessary in terms of geo-
political competition, but ultimately futile, as suggested by Robert Browning: - 
Neither empire could hope to destroy the other militarily. Their centres of power were too distant,
in the Mediterranean basin and the high plateau of Iran respectively. Yet for century after century
Roman and Persian armies fought one another in the bleak hills of Armenia and on the parched
plains of Mesopotamia. The best outcome that could be hoped for was a minor rectification of the
frontier. In a sense it was one of the stupidest wars in history. Yet it had its rationale. Neither
power could afford, for economic as much as for strategic reasons, to let the other dominate the
disputed zones of Armenia and Mesopotamia. What they fought for was prestige, to show the
Armenians and above all the Aramaic peoples which of them was 'top nation'.(10) 
These views may be slightly exaggerated. Rome with difficulty established strong northern borders
that would only partially stabilise its relations with Gallic, German and trans-Danubian tribes,(11) 
while Parthia always had to contend with the fluid movement of peoples across Central Asia. Thus,
Rome and Parthia emerged as central powers within a wider landscape of states, kingdoms and tribes
that stretched from Britain to China. Parthia, in particular, had a complex task in negotiating power
relations to its east and north, including the conquest of the Kushans, deflecting the invading Alani
and Huns, and forging positive diplomatic relations with China.(12) 
Yet the Persians and Parthians did form part of an entrenched cultural frontier in terms of perceptions
and literary types. From the time of Homeric literature onwards mental and cultural barriers were
established as part of the emerging identity of those who would later on be claimed as quintessential
Europeans: the Greeks and the Romans. Greece was a collection of communities on the mainland the
Aegean, and there, east across the wine-dark seas was Troy, and far to the south Phoenicia and Egypt.
In time the horizon was shifted further east to the suddenly risen empire of Persia that had swallowed
Media, Babylon, Assyria, Lydia and thereafter all of the Middle East. The Achaemenids cast a huge
shadow across Jewish and Biblical traditions, as well as forming a key protagonist for the Hellenic
world. The Trojan and Persian wars would form dominant literary types that shaped propaganda and
history in subsequent Hellenistic and Roman periods.(14) Thus: "Not only were the Persian Wars
seen as a rerun of the Trojan, Alexander's was too."(14)  
However, the Greek horizon was circumscribed by more than rumour, imagination and warfare. It
was also shaped by direct contact via exploration, trade, diplomacy and colonisation. The eastern
'frontier' would be moved east as colonies were established in Asia Minor, making the Aegean a
Greek Sea, followed by colonies in the Black Sea, and scattered to a lesser degree through much of
the eastern and central Mediterranean. The Greeks encountered kingdoms in Asia Minor, diverse
barbarian groups on the fringes of Black Sea (Scythians and later on Celts), and knew of the ancient
wonders of Egypt. But the great 'oppositional' other to the east that would shape their sense of history
was the Persia of the Achaemenids, which during the 5th century B.C. threatened to absorb not just 
Asia Minor but all of the Aegean and mainland Greece. Most Europeans have received the stories of
heroic Spartans and robust Athenians, turning back the Persian hoards. These images have become
fables and movie themes, vaguely known even by those that read little. It now forms the focus of
television documentaries that explicate, via animated graphics, on the way the Persians
underestimated Greek hoplites. Through this medium we now see the heroic defence at Marathon, the
Spartans who died at Thermopylae, and the 'wooden wall' of ships that would smash the Persian fleet
almost within sight of Athens (the naval battle at Salamis).(15)  
In Greek accounts, eventual defeat of the Persians in mainland Greece was seen as partly due to their
sacrilegious destruction of Athenian temples, and the willingness of Xerxes to be influenced against
his better judgement by a dream, presumably sent by the gods to force him into a hubristic war which
allowed fate to be unravelled.(16) It was these types of considerations which made Xerxes an ideal
person to be chosen as an example of Asian despotism and excessive hubris in Aeschylus' play The 
Persians.(17) It was his arrogance in attacking Greece, most of all, that set him against the limits
appointed by the gods.(18) Beyond this, the east was a source of wealth, booty, territorial expansion,
and of power based on military resources, taxes and hegemonic control of 'nations' and cities, a key
realist motive for aggressive wars wages by Greeks, Macedonians and Romans.(19)  
However, the knowledge, diplomacy and motivations of those who fought these wars were also
shaped by religious, literary and cultural factors. In these world views, epitomised by Herodotus and
Thucydides and known to every English school child in the first half of the 20st century, those who 
Medized (went over to the Persians) were the great collaborators, traitors to the Hellenic ideal. In
reality, this included many states in Asia Minor and the far north that had to face the brunt of superior
Persian land and naval forces, including much of Northern Greece and Boeotia. Thebes above all was
held up for this distain, an insult that would later be thrown at it by the young Alexander as he sought
to retain Macedonian hegemony by the utter destruction of the rebellious city as an example to others.
(20)  
Beyond these stereotypes, however, there was a more complex legacy of Persian civil and military
power. Alongside its authoritarian and ruthless side, there were positive elements in the Persian
empire as a zone of relative stability and partial tolerance. Its levels of taxation were relatively light, it
created a zone of partial peace in which trade and cultural diffusion flourished, and during its early
period it was not interested in forcing its religion on non-Iranians, allowing high levels of religious 
freedom in Babylon, Jerusalem and, initially, in Egypt.(21) Its empire had some cosmopolitan
features, with Aramaic being used as a lingua franca, and strong artistic borrowings from Greek 
artisans that mingled with Iranian patterns of architecture.(22) Furthermore, from the end of the
Persian Wars until the conquests of Alexander, the King of Persia played an important balancing role
in Greek affairs, acting to influence power relations throughout the region.(23) It was during this
period that there was some acculturation between the Persian and Greek spheres of influence,
particularly in the eastern Aegean.(24) By the late fourth century B.C. there was a considerable
degree of contact and mutual awareness between the Greek and Persian cultures, and between
Macedonian and Persian court systems.(25) 
It was under Alexander the Great that the view of Persia as the great enemy was once again
resurrected, a unifying focus for Macedonian ambitions and by the nominal demand for revenge for
the past Persian burning of Greek temples.(26) Later on, Polybius would recount the Persians as rich
and decadent, a people whose 'cowardice and indolence' made them fit for Macedonian conquest.(27)
The account of Arrian shows us an ambitious but brilliant Alexander defeating a tragic but flawed
Persian king, then 'inheriting' his empire. Alexander in the modern period is sometimes presented as
the carrier of Greek culture eastwards and the creator of a civilising Hellenistic empire.(28) If true, he
was also a destroyer, wiping out cities that opposed him too fiercely, and possibly, the intentional
destroyer of the artistic glory of Persepolis.(29)  
Indeed, some Persians and Iranian sources view Alexander as a barbarian destroyer of culture, rather
than as the spreader of a proud Hellenism.(30) Indeed, the Sasanian 'propaganda' tended to dismiss
the earlier Arsacid dynasty as a disastrous period based on Alexander's humiliating intervention.(31)
Thus: - 
The shadow of Alexander always lay heavily on all who had felt it. For the Iranians, it had
haunted their consciousness for a millennium as a constant reminder of their humiliating defeat
by an invader whose victory the Iranians had looked upon more than any other single event as
the source of their misfortunes, as well as their grievances and rage towards the West.(32) 
However, recent analysis has suggested that for a time Alexander also sought to mobilise the Iranian
peoples as an important third tier, standing alongside Macedonians and Greeks as a group whose
skills were needed to help administer his empire. Though not a genuine fusion policy,(34) it was at
least a pragmatic recognition of the talents of the Iranians and Medes who had controlled much of the
Near East. This led to two parallel traditions in Iran's national history: - 
According to genuine Iranian tradition, Alexander destroyed the integrity of the Iranian empire by
undermining the authority of its kings and dividing the land among feudatory lords. Further, he
ruined fire temples, killed Zoroastrian priests and destroyed their manuscripts, transferring
Persian science and philosophy to Rum (Greece). On the other hand, the legendary tale of
Alexander, written by pseudo-Callisthenes sometime before the 4th century, was translated into 
Middle Persian during the 6th century, and its content, with some modifications, was later adopted
into the body of Iranian historical traditions. In the Iranian form of the romance, Alexander
becomes a son of Dara I and a half brother of his adversary, Dara II.(35) 
Likewise, in the Persian accounts such as the Shah-nama (2696), those who had supported Alexander 
are portrayed negatively, while 'The Letter of Tansar' King Adashir asserts his desire to fight the
Rumis (at this stage the Greeks, i.e. 'the people of Alexander') and avenge Dara.(36) Alexander is thus
represented on the one hand as a legitimate successor fit to revenge the death of Darius III (by modern
reckoning, perhaps to be linked with Dara II in the Iranian national histories), on the other hand as a
tyrant, an evil king of 'foreign blood'.(37) The effort to legitimate Alexander as, in some sense,
Persian is also found in the myth that he was in fact the unrecognised son of Dara I and the 'daughter
of Rum' who had been sent back to her homeland, a story that had been translated in Middle Persian,
Syriac and Arabic.(38) In medieval Persian poetry the Romans survived as the Rum, 'merely a stock 
image for the exotic, for distance, for the barbaric, occasionally for mystery'.(39) 
These images have been dealt with in detail by modern revisionist historians,(40) since both the
Persian Wars and the Age of Alexander are virtual founding 'myths' in the traditional accounts of
European cultural and political history.(41) Less explored and certainly less prominent in the public
imagination is the later role of other great empires in the east, especially the Parthian and later Persian
dynasties, beginning with the Sasanid house of Iran form circa AD 226(42), that would both
challenge and counterbalance Roman power in the Middle East. This interaction would have a
profound influence on the political realities and culture of the Roman and Byzantine Empire, thereby
adding an important thread that needs to be followed. Furthermore, as we shall see, these Parthian and
later Persian domains were themselves influenced by Hellenistic culture, and were the repository of
Greek learning that would prepare the ground for the later flourishing of Islamic scholarship,
medicine and science.(43)  
Parthia, moreover, became the great balancing and contending power for Rome in the East, while
from the late Middle Ages on into the early 20th century Persia was an exotic domain intoxicating the
European imagination. As the emerging modern state of Iran, it would also be subject to the pressures
of the Great Game played out between Russia and England, and then to the harsh realities of a
weakening power buffered by the forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism. The current 'Iranian 
threat' mythology, played out in particular by both the U.S. administration and to a lesser extent Saudi
Arabia, still contains echoes of this imagery of a dangerous and savage 'other' which cannot be
viewed as a normal state, in spite of some reform efforts.(44) As part of President Bush's 'axis of evil',
as a potential nuclear power, and as a state with strong 'theocratic' restraints that limit the democratic
process,(45) it remains a focus of threat perceptions and historical projections that may undermine
positive public diplomacy. 
Parthia in Mind 
Parthia established itself as an independent region by breaking away from the Seleucid Kingdom in
the third century B.C. (circa 250-238 B.C.), with the Arsacids defeating an independent satrap,
probably Andragoras, by 238 B.C.(46) Thereafter the Parthians fought to become a locus of
independent power as the strength of the Seleucid kingdom fluctuated. This was based on the
vigorous action of Arsaces I in invading Parthia (from adjacent northern regions) as satrapal control
wavered, when Seleucus II was engaged in war with his half brother Antiochus Hierax, and then in
the following Third Syrian War.(47) Parthia was further established by the following military policies
of Arsaces I and Arsaces II.(48) Nominal control was reasserted by Antiochus III the Great,(49) when
once again the Parthians were for a short time viewed as vassals, but this could not be sustained and
Parthian control of adjacent regions began to create what can be legitimately viewed as an empire.
(50) The last attempt by the Seleucids to reassert control of Media and eastern territories (circa 129
B.C., under Antiochus VII) failed, leaving Parthia the major power in abutting the Hellenistic
kingdoms.(51) Thus, 'the Hellenistic landscape of the Further East was transformed and the history of
Seleucid decline over the eastern Iranian plateau became as much a part of the history of Central Asia
and India, as it did of the history of Hellenism'.(52) Like Persia before it, Parthia became the
controlling focus of the region interposed between the Hellenistic world and the great cultural
systems of India, Central Asia and China. 
The Parthians are first heard of in the sixth century B.C. in the Behistun Inscription as the 'Parthava',
'Parthva' or 'Parthwa' people, who had taken part in the widespread revolts of the time, but thereafter
are recorded as peaceful subjects of the Achæmenian period, 515-331 B.C. (53) Probably of Scythian 
origin (the Parni tribe), the Parthians were influenced by east Iranian language, political traditions and
dress habits, but might only generally be classified as 'Iranians'.(54) It is probable that those known to
us as the Parni were part of the more extensive Dahae confederation, and that they had moved into the
eastern fringes of the Caspian Sea ('northern Parthia') during the early third century B.C.(55) 
They were known as skilled nomadic horseman, with this view taken up with some relish by George
Rawlinson, a late 19th century historian: - 
Like the Turkoman and Tâtar tribes generally, they passed almost their whole lives on horseback,
conversing, transacting business, buying and selling, even eating, while mounted on their horses.
They practised polygamy, secluded their women from the sight of men, punished unfaithfulness
with extreme severity, delighted in hunting, and rarely ate any flesh but that which they obtained
in this way, were moderate eaters but great drinkers, did not speak much, but yet were very
unquiet, being constantly engaged in stirring up trouble either abroad or at home.(56)  
The stereotypes are continued in Rawlinson's account of Parthian motivations: - 
But in Parthia Greek rule was from the first cast aside. The native Asiatics rebelled against their
masters. A people of a rude and uncivilised type, coarse and savage, but brave and freedom-
loving, rose up against the polished but comparatively effeminate Greeks, who held them in
subjection, and claimed and succeeded in establishing their independence. The Parthian
kingdom was thoroughly anti-Hellenic. It appealed to patriotic feelings, and to the hate universally
felt towards the stranger. It set itself to undo the work of Alexander, to cast out the Europeans, to
recover for the native race the possession of its own continent. "Asia for the Asiatics," was its cry.
(57)  
It was also claimed that 'they combined great military prowess and vigour with a capacity for
organisation and government', but they never to 'any extent amalgamated with the subject peoples, but
continued for centuries an exclusive dominant race, encamped in the countries which they had
overrun.'(58) Similar value judgements of the Parthians go back at least as far as Strabo, who in
describing them as Scythians and barbarians was supporting the Graeco-Roman view of nomads as 
inherently less civilized than farmer-based communities.(59) Strabo lumps the Parthians in with other
barbarians (such as the Celts) who practised 'guerilla warfare'.(60) For Ammianus Marcellinus, the
Parthians were 'savage and warlike', though he recognised that Persia had authentic divination
methods and an 'uncorrupted cult of the divine'.(61) These views led to a some underestimation of the
Parthians (and related peoples), and contributed directly to the later defeats of Roman commanders
such as Crassus and Mark Antony (62). The Graeco-Roman view, which tended to colour early 
European accounts, provided embedded motifs that drove forward a set of 'recurring images'
concerning an 'Eastern' other: 'degeneracy, despotism, cruelty, treachery, instability, weakness', all
ways of cloaking 'a feared and powerful foe'.(63) Ammianus Marcellinus' historical account of the
fourth century A.D., for example, abounds with common place stereotypes of the cruelty of the
Persian king, who ruled through fear and terror, only at times masked by pretences of 'mildness'.(64) 
For ideological and pragmatic reasons as well, Parthian studies were overshadowed by other areas of
modern academic study: - 
An unwarrantedly negative and suspicious attitude towards the Parthians appears strangely
widespread among scholars, with whom the Parthians, at bottom, have never been popular: in
the case of the Iranists, because of the absence, perhaps, of adequate historical sources
originating from the Parthian empire that might have engaged their attention by providing sound
evidence of the specifically Iranian cultural conceptions of the Arsacids and of the continuity of
these conceptions between the Achaemenids and the Sasanids; in the case of the
archaeologists, because of the heterogeneity, perhaps, of the culture of the countries of the
Parthian empire, though such a view overlooks the fact that precisely this heterogeneity is one of
the reasons for the cultural greatness and vitality of this empire.(65) 
The Parthians tried to limit Greek and Hellenistic influence politically, for example in their choice of
major centres and capitals (Dara, Arsak, Hecatompylus, Ctesiphon, Old and New Nisa, Vologasias),
e.g. Ctesiphon was probably born as a major military camp across the Tigris River from the
Hellenistic commercial city of Seleucia.(66) However, contra early stereotypes, they could not help
but be influenced by Hellenistic practices.(67) Thus their coinage initially took on Seleucid types, and
Mithridiates I 'as earnest of his goodwill towards the Greek communities scattered throughout his new
kingdom he introduced on his coinage that of Philheliene', indicating one who was a friend of Greeks 
and Greek culture.(68) Artistic styles in sculpture and architecture were strongly influenced by
Hellenistic forms, though there are also architectural details that go back to earlier Achaemenid
sources, even if little detailed knowledge of Achaemenid political ideology survived into the Parthian
period.(69) Parthian art was noted for its fine metal work, including animal forms influenced in part
by Iranian styles.(70) Ironically, as Seleucid political control of Parthia slipped away, Arsacid Parthia
'increasingly assimilated with Hellenistic and later Roman culture'.(71)  
However, in the long term, Parthian art created a complex and diverse legacy in its own right, even as
it drew on diverse regional traditions. Sasanian music would also become part of the bedrock of
classical music in the Near East, with strong influence on later Persian, Armenian, Georgian and
Arabian styles.(72) Likewise, Parthian minstrels (gosan or gusan) laid a foundation of romantic and 
heroic tales that would find reflection in later Persian literature,(73) as well as in the bards and
minstrels that could still be found in parts of Turkey, Iran, Armenia and Georgia down till the 20th
century.(74)  
The Parthians ruled a diverse but loosely organised empire in which they both transmitted and
adapted a wide range of cultural traditions. Furthermore, Parthia 'was a large kingdom with a long and
distinctive tradition of civilization, coherent government, and domination over subject peoples' for
over four hundred years.(75) As such, they were more than warriors and 'barbarians', and carried
patterns of governance, economy and society that have yet to be adequately appreciated in generalised
accounts of world history. The very lack of tight centralisation allowed some level of local autonomy
(using a system of inner satrapies and partially autonomous 'peripheral dependent states'), and
encouraged some degree of religious tolerance and local syncretism, though the Parthians in the main
were probably Zoroastrians.(76) 
Roman Relationships with Parthia: Lucullus to Septimius Severus 
Parthia became a major issue for Roman policy virtually as soon as Rome inherited direct interests in
Greece and Asia Minor, i.e. by the 1st century B.C. In effect, the Parthians came to dominate the
lands viewed by the Romans as 'beyond' the Euphrates River, with so many countries and tribes under
their control that they became 'rivals' with Rome, largely due to Parthian successes in warfare.(77)
Indeed, the control of the East and the Parthian threat became one of the 'grand preoccupations' of
Roman policy, even if no grand strategy could be successfully hammered out to finally end this
menace.(78) Nor would repeated treaties and an emerging diplomacy of accommodation forge a
permanent peace. These tensions were driven by the internal politics of leadership in Rome, and in
part due to the sense of openness and vulnerability of Syria, with the Euphrates River not being a
strong physical barrier and at best a problematic frontier.(79) 
However, this period of contact and accommodation was a drawn out process, and during first century
B.C., Parthia and nearby kingdoms were themselves subject to diverse military pressures: - 
The three mighty kingdoms of Parthia, Armenia, and Pontus were at this time strategic buffer
states between the Western World and the Far East. They were under pressure simultaneously
from the Romans of the West and from the Sakas, the Sacrucae, and the Tocharians of the
northeast, who were being pushed westwards by the relentless and inexorable pressure of the
Huns, who were pressed in turn by the Chinese.(80)  
For Rome, these partly Hellenised kingdoms became a foci of foreign policy and military
entanglement, especially the kingdom of Pontus in northern Asia Minor. The fates of these three
countries were soon entangled with each other and Rome: - 
. . . Mithridates [II] intervened in the affairs of Armenia and placed his protégé, Tigranes, on the
throne. By so doing he inaugurated a new era in the history of that country, whose future fortunes
were to remain closely linked to those of Iran. Shortly afterwards Tigranes allied himself with
Mithridates Eupator of Pontus who, between 112 and 93 B.C., created a powerful kingdom that
included all Asia Minor and bordered on continental Greece and for many years resisted the
Roman advance. Faced with this alliance which strengthened the position of Armenia, Mithridates
II adopted a waiting policy. When in 92 B.C. the Romans reached the Euphrates, he sent them
an embassy with a proposal of alliance. Sulla, knowing nothing of Parthian importance and
power, treated the envoy in so cavalier a manner that the Great King took offence and came to
terms with the two other oriental princes. Rome was to pay dearly for its contemptuous attitude
on the occasion of this first contact with the Parthians.(81)  
It is in fact more likely that Sulla understood the implications of the diplomacy involved, and set up
the meeting and its seating arrangements in a way to ensure that he was viewed as the arbiter of
arrangements with Armenia, and sought to establish a psychological, if short-term, advantage over 
Parthia in order to 'extract concessions'.(82) 
Roman leaders including Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey had to be sent out at different times to deal
with one of the dreaded 'eastern' enemies of Rome, Mithridates VI Eupator of Pontus. Sulla's
sustained efforts did manage to push Mithridates VI out of conquered territories, but after 85 B.C.
Pontus was able to rebuild its power base. For ambitious Roman leaders, however, military
commands were a way of extending their power, wealth and influence, especially if they achieved
victories over powerful enemies or made beneficial settlements.(83) On the other hand, the internal
politics of the late Roman Republic might also curtail wars and imperial expansion: - 
Sulla wanted peace so as to be free to get back to Italy and take revenge on the followers of
Marius and Cinna. The peace he made in 85 B.C. at Dardanus in the Troad was the softest a
Roman was ever known to make, especially with an enemy like Mithridates, who had robbed and
murdered at least 100,000 Roman and Italian citizens. All Mithridates was required to do was
abandon all his conquests in Asia Minor, surrender eighty of his warships, and pay the trifling
indemnity of 2,000 talents (two and a half million dollars).(84)  
However, political and military victories could not always be guaranteed, nor create a stable state
system along the eastern frontier. Although Lucullus made a successful invasion of Armenia in 69-8 
B.C. and managed to maintain the de facto neutrality of Parthia,(85) he found himself accused of
unnecessarily prolonging the war and was deprived of command by 67 B.C.(86) Mithridates was able
to return to Pontus, pushing Roman forces out at the Battle of Zela (spring 67 B.C.). Pompey the
Great would thereafter attempt a much broader 'settlement' of the East, with one major agenda being
the ability to establish a strong ring of states to exclude Parthian influence. Pompey invaded Pontus
and defeated Mithridates' forces near Dasteira(87) [Mithridates of Pontus went on fighting and
scheming until 63 B.C., and at the weary age of 68 had one of his Celtic bodyguards help him commit
suicide, a story retold in Racine's Mithridate (88)]. Pompey pushed into Armenia, allowing Tigranes
to keep his kingdom, but cutting down his territory. Though Parthian forces for a time occupied the
region of Gordyene (on the Tigris), Pompey thereafter took a tough line with the Parthians, refusing
to allow them to occupy territories he had promised them.(89)  
To support this, however, Pompey needed to ensure a ring of provinces and client states along the
frontier, forming a diplomatic and military settlement that would not readily be undermined by affairs
occurring further to the east. Pompey then turned south and moved forces into Syria, annexing it as a
new province. He then went on to 'help' settle a dispute in Judea between the 'princes' Hyrcanus and
Aristobulus. He settled against Aristobulus,(90) and besieged his followers in the great Temple at
Jerusalem, only breaking in after a difficult three month siege. The Jewish historian Josephus records
that Pompey walked into the forbidden and sacred sanctuary of the Jews, noting there the sacred
objects associated with the cult.(91) Pompey recognised Hyracnus as High Priest, but not as the king
of Judea, thereby paving the way for the establishment of a later client kingdom in Judea.(92) From
this time on Parthia would always have to keep an eye on the Roman legions strategically stationed in
Syria, just to the north.  
Pompey's settlement in the east was quite masterly. It established a ring of wealthy provinces on the
Mediterranean, and then put in place a range of client kingdoms as buffer states to the east and south
against the growing power of the Parthians. Provinces included Bithynia et Pontus, Asia, Cilicia, and
Syria, with client-kingdoms in Galatia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, Armenior Minor, Commagene,
Bosphorusm Oshoene east of the Euphrates, and Damascus, controlled by the Nabataean Arabs.(93)
To the south there was the controlled kingdom of Judea, and for a time, the friendly kingdom of
Egypt. This system was effective, but still needed pliant kings controlling Armenia, which could be
reached equally by the Parthians marching up the Euphrates as by Roman forces moving from Asia
Minor and Syria. A major conflict with Parthia over Armenia, however, was avoided at that time,
circa 64 B.C..(94) 
We can see the mixed attitudes to the Parthians in the subsequent actions of a Roman leader such as
Crassus. A millionaire politician, he also wished to establish himself as a general of the stature of his
triumviral colleagues, Pompey and Caesar.(95) His target for this political ambition, possibly
combined with expectations of rich booty,(96) was Parthia, unfortunately for him and his followers. It
is possible that Crassus hoped to make use of his incursion to support a claimant of the Parthian
throne who was 'a Roman sympathiser'.(97) However, Crassus' advance was too slow to achieve this,
and he, his son and seven legions were wiped out by the Parthian cavalry at the battle of Carrhae.
Crassus had unwisely let his legions be lured away from the Euphrates river onto the open plain
where the enemy's superior cavalry could operate. After the destruction of the Roman cavalry units,
the defensive formations of the Roman legions were gradually worn down by the attacks of mounted
archers and forced to retreat to whatever defensive terrain was available. Crassus proved himself an
ineffective commander when faced with an enemy using unfamiliar tactics and strategies of
misdirection. On the plain the legionaries could neither close with their enemy, nor escape
encirclement.(98) The Parthians apparently deployed a thousand heavily armoured lancers, nine
thousand horse archers, and a baggage train of a thousand camels supplying extra arrows, arrows
which when projected by the Parthian compound bow could penetrate Roman armour.(99) 
As 'grand strategy' this was a classic example of over-reach, and its dangers may have been well 
recognised in Rome where it was opposed by elements in the Senate and most vigorously by a
tribune.(100) Crassus had marched down the Euphrates, after having ignored the advice of the
Armenian king to move into Mesopotamia through the mountainous terrain of Armenia, where he
could muster a larger force of local cavalry. Crassus had taken the precaution of providing himself
with auxiliary units of 4,000 cavalry and 4,000 light troops,(101) but these would prove insufficient
once he allowed himself to be lured away from the river onto the open plain and cut off by enemy
cavalry. The Parthian units consisted of two main types: the mounted archer, who used a powerful
double convex bow, and secondly, brigades of heavy cavalry,(102) who to some degree are the
ancestors of the European knights, though they lacked stirrups and therefore did not have couched
lances. By the fourth century A.D. we also hear of the Persians using close fitting coats of flexible
mail that deflect Roman missiles.(103) The tactics of these combined cavalry forces are described by
Plutarch: - 
Now they could be seen clearly, their helmets and breastplates blazing like fire, their Margianian
steel glittering keen and bright, their horses armoured with plates of bronze and steel. . . . Their
original plan was to charge the Romans with their lances and force their way through their front
ranks. But when they saw the depth of the wall of shields with which they were confronted and
how steadfastly and firmly the men were standing, they drew back again, while giving the
impression that they were breaking their ranks and losing all cohesion, actually succeeded in
surrounding the hollow square before the Romans realized what was happening. . . . The
Parthians now spread out and began to shoot their arrows from all sides. There was no attempt
at accurate marksmanship, since the Romans were so densely crowded together that it was
impossible to miss the target even if one wished to do so. They merely kept on shooting with their
great strong bows, curved so as to give the maximum impetus to the arrows, and the blows fell
powerfully and heavily upon the Romans. Thus the positions of the Romans was, from the first, a
very awkward one. If they stayed in their ranks they were wounded one after the other; if they
attempted to come to close quarters with the enemy, they were still unable to do the enemy any
harm and suffered just as much themselves. For the Parthians shot as they fled, being, indeed,
more adept at this than anyone else except the Scythians . . . (104) 
The result of this attempt to establish Crassus' military prestige led to some 20,000 Roman deaths,
with another 10,000 captured.(105) He also lost the standards of these legions, a dishonour that would
not be forgotten in later relations between the two empires, and whose return would be a later
diplomatic triumph. This campaign was blighted by poor generalship and poor intelligence: on
several occasions Crassus was expertly mislead by his enemies. By this stage Parthia had emerged as
a great power able to crush Roman legions at will, a shadow threatening Roman dominion of the east
and controlling for a short time Syria and Judaea in a later offensive of circa 40-38 B.C. (106). 
Following the defeat of Crassus Parthian forces penetrated across the Euphrates into Syria but were at
that time turned back by Cassius.(107) In turn, Parthia remained a target for the military ambition of
later Roman leaders. If Parthia was the great enemy in the east, its defeat would also carry a unique
prestige to a conquering general. In this context, Julius Caesar had apparently planned an ambitious
Parthian campaign and had begun drafting troops, but did not live to conduct it.(108) 
Mark Antony, too, launched a major campaign against the Parthians, who had used the opportunity of
civil conflict to overrun parts of the Roman East, including Asia Minor, Syria and Judaea. Antony
first sent his general Ventidius against them, who defeated Parthian incursive forces in major battles
between 39 and 38 B.C. Antony then used the north-eastern route through Armenia into Media, 
whose king Artavasdes 'capitulated' and provided Antony with support cavalry forces.(109) Antony
was successful until his supply routes through Armenia were threatened by a revolt and his baggage
train attacked. He was forced to withdraw with the loss of some two legions plus several thousand
other men.(110) He had defeated the Parthians in numerous battles, but was unable to force a decisive
encounter, and could neither hold territory nor destroy the main enemy forces.(111) Nonetheless,
images of eastern conquests may have formed part of some long term notion of his sovereignty of the
east: Antony himself held a kind of triumph for his victories in Armenia, and then made a public
'donation' of parts of the east to Queen Cleopatra, including Cyprus, Libya and part of Syria. He went
on to nominate his son (by Cleopatra), called Alexander, the king of Armenia, Media and Parthia
(though none of these were fully conquered). His other son was to receive Phoenicia, Syria and
Cilicia.(112) This went well beyond the kind of client relations Pompey had established in the region,
though it may have been a display set up mainly for propaganda purposes.  
After the victory of Octavian over Antony at Actium and then in Egypt, we find a modified policy
emerging towards the east and Parthia. Egypt from this time was ruled by an eques under direct 
control of Octavian, and no members of the Senatorial class were allowed to visit without his express
permission.(113) Likewise, Syria as a strategic region would come under the control of high ranging
commanders, and later on imperial appointees or legatus rather than those under nominal senatorial 
control.(114) Antony's actual arrangements for the east were only changed in minor details,(115) with
some enhancement of Herod the Great's position, but with the use of diplomacy to bring about an
accommodation with Parthia.(116) The 'great conquest' of Parthia, yearned for in the literature of the
period, and recorded on coins and in the Res Gestae of Augustus, was little more than the skilful 
management of eastern diplomacy.(117) The Romans soon decided on a politic approach to the
frontier: - 
Under Octavian, who soon had himself transformed into Emperor Augustus ( 27 B.C.E.-14 C.E.), 
Rome adopted a very different attitude toward Parthia from that which had shaped its policy since
the time of Sulla. He concluded, as a practical matter, that Parthia simply did not pose a serious
threat to Rome or Roman interests anywhere west of the Euphrates for the foreseeable future.
Parthia itself was plagued with far too much internal dissension, palace intrigues, rebellions, and
succession crises to be an effective aggressor beyond its existing territorial bounds. A dynastic
feud had broken out between the king Phraates IV and the pretender Tiridates that had kept the
Parthians preoccupied, effectively preventing them from taking advantage of the turmoil in the
Roman ranks preceding the battle of Actium. Tiridates was ultimately defeated but managed to
escape across the Euphrates to Roman-held territory in Syria. This gave Augustus an important
bargaining chip that he exploited with skill, reaching an agreement with Phraates in 23 that
delineated their common frontiers.  
Notwithstanding the expansionist ambitions of some of his advisers, Augustus had decided to
pursue a more conservative policy with regard to Parthia. He was mindful of the fact that the
Parthians had demonstrated repeatedly that they could be especially formidable when it came to
mobilizing their resources for defense. In other words, Augustus recognized the practical utility of
drawing a mutually acceptable frontier between Rome and Parthia at the Euphrates, something
that Pompeius had refused to do.(118) 
Augustus conducted a major tour of the eastern provinces between 22 and 19 B.C., ensuring
meanwhile that one of the two consuls was a supporter and a military man being ennobled by that
office for the first time, e.g. L. Arruntius, M. Lollius and C. Sentius Saturninus.(119) Diplomacy and
careful pressure were used to secure the return of the standards lost by Crassus to the Parthians (hence
Roman coins were issued with the legend Signis Receptis, 'Standards Recovered'), while a Roman 
choice was made for the ruler of Armenia, indicating a pro-Roman settlement through 20 B.C. that 
helped regional trade flows.(120) Moreover, the diplomatic relations through 20-10 B.C. 'was in fact 
a Roman recognition of Parthia's power', with Augustus willing to let Armenia remain within the orbit
of Parthian hegemony so long as Rome approved the Armenian king.(121) Phraates IV gave over four
of his sons as hostages to M. Titius, governor of Syria, but this may have been to control internal
seditions and plots as much as to secure Roman 'friendship'.(122) 
By AD 1 new tensions had emerged, as had a stronger grasp of diplomatic means to deal with them: - 
The Parthian had written to explain his activity in Armenia and to demand back his brothers who
were in Rome. Augustus' reply omitted to call Phraataces 'king' and demanded that he lay aside
the royal name and withdraw from Armenia. This was a tough public stance to support the
personal mission to the East on which his adopted son Gaius had embarked. In a further letter,
Phraataces styled himself 'king of kings' and referred to Augustus merely as Caesar. These well-
modulated insults reveal a remarkable knowledge of the political set-up in the other country. But it 
is clear that both sides knew how to keep the insults within reasonable limits, as part of the
diplomatic manoeuvring, and they did not undermine the attempt to find a negotiated settlement.
(123)  
This diplomacy culminated in a high level meeting between Gaius and Phraataces, leading to an
'equal' treaty that formed a major precedent for events over the next six decades.(124) It led to the
Euphrates being recognised as the demarcated and symbolic border between the two empires.(125) 
These trends accord with the proposals for the natural 'limits to empire' that Augustus seems to have
passed on in his 'last testament' to Tiberius.(126) From now on, Syria would be a crucial military
province viewed as a base for both defence of the empire,(127) and a salient for power projection
against Armenia and Parthia as required. In turn the Romans feared that the Parthians would come to
have the long-term goal of conquering Syria permanently, though this proved untenable.(128) It was
also not far from troublesome regions such Judaea and Palestine. Likewise, for the following decades
Rome would be deeply interested in establishing greater Roman influence on Armenia, and in
securing a friendly princes on the throne of that kingdom, such as Tigranes II.(128) This led to
continued tensions through the reigns of the emperors Tiberius and Nero, with limited clashes
continuing in AD 37, through 51-57 A.D. and again in 62 A.D.(130) It is possible that these policies
were also stimulated by calls for revenge against the Parthians on the part of Roman authors and the
public, even if the Parthians themselves remained 'shadowy figures' to most citizens.(131) In the long
run, however, Rome would find Armenia most useful as a balancing state, hinged across both Roman
and Parthian spheres of interest.(132) 
Through the second half of the first century, Rome and Parthia achieved a rough balance of power in
the east, hinged on control of Armenia, and with a de facto border along the Euphrates River, though
this was always more a psychological and political frontier than a real physical barrier.(133) Even
though Rome probably had more wealth and power, it was also unable to secure permanent victories
against Parthia. Parthia, in turn, had to face major territorial challenges in the east and north, and
found its security readily undermined by Armenian plots, Roman incursions from Syria, or by internal
dissent. These trends can be summarised: - 
Vologases now placed Tiridates (63-100) back on the throne of Armenia, but also suggested a
political compromise to resolve the seemingly endless conflict with Rome over the country. He
proposed that both Rome and Parthia agree to reestablish the Euphrates as the frontier between
them. While he continued to insist that Tiridates be acknowledged as king of Armenia, he
proposed, as a means of satisfying the public requirements of Roman honor, that Tiridates
should receive his crown from the hands of Nero in Rome. This suggestion was acceptable to
Nero, who had little interest in attempting to extend Roman control any farther eastward. Nero
subsequently formally invested Tiridates, with great pomp, as king of Armenia in Rome in 66.
Following this, the relations between Rome and Parthia remained relatively stable and peaceful
for another fifty years.(134)  
This was followed by a period of 'rapprochement' under the reign of Vespasian, with the Parthians
even willing to offer support to the Romans in the Jewish War, and asking for Roman help against an
Alan incursion, a request at this stage refused.(135) Vespasian, however, did move to rationalise the
eastern frontier, annexing the kingdom of Commagene, gaining control of Palmyra, improved supply
routes from the Black Sea and across Anatolia, and fortified Marmozica (in modern Georgia) in A.D.
75, though this did not lead to a major breach with the Parthians.(136) 
However, such relative concord could not be sustained indefinitely. The attraction of expanding the
eastern frontier was to be a recurring feature of Roman imperial policy in the second century.
Between A.D. 111 and 117 the Roman emperor Trajan would prepare the ground for strengthening
the eastern defences and then engage in major campaigns against Parthia, mobilising at least eleven
legions plus their auxiliaries.(137) One of Trajan's first tasks was to stabilise the Roman Empire's
northern frontiers, after which he sought a more conclusive solution to the 'Parthian' problem, by now
viewed as Rome's traditional enemy in the east.(138) Trajan sought fame through military glory, and
he may even have hoped to emulate the successes of Alexander the Great, a factor that also influenced
Pompey, Crassus and the emperor Julian.(139) Moreover, these frontiers were real sources of
insecurity to the Romans, and by 'securing' them Trajan also sought to ensure the prestige and
stability of his own reign.(140) It is also possible that, as a secondary goal, Rome sought greater
control over trade routes, thereby cutting out the Parthian 'middleman', whose communities had
benefited from the Silk Road transit trade.(141)  
It was perhaps for these reasons that Trajan rejected peace offers from King Osroes in A.D. 113.(142)
He used the pretext that the Parthians had recognised a new king of Armenia without Roman
approval, and firmly rejected an embassy that sought recognition of Parthamasiris, thereby ensuring
that military conflict would continue.(143) Trajan first annexed the region of Jordan, known as the
province of 'Arabia', with its capital at the ancient trading city of Petra, thus reinforcing the frontier by
establishing a network of roads, towers and camps on this southern border that would be extended
into northern Mesopotamia.(144) In 114 A.D. he launched a full scale invasion of Armenia, Adiabene
and then Parthia,(145) successfully pushing down the Euphrates to capture Ctesiphon and marching
south to the Persian Gulf. On this basis, he earned the title of Parthicus, recorded on a milestone on 
the road between Nisibis and Singara.(146) 
Though Trajan had the power to conquer, he lacked the ability to hold or consolidate these gains. Two
major problems undermined his victories. Through A.D. 115-117 there was a major insurrection of 
Jews in the Levant, including rebellions in Egypt and Judaea, as well as riots by Jews within
Mesopotamia itself. It is possible but not certain that this indicated 'concerted resistance' to Trajan's
expedition against Parthia.(147) Although suppressed, these revolts threatened his lines of supply and
sapped reserve military forces. General revolts in southern Mesopotamia, and attacks on his supply
bases in northern Mesopotamia,(148) forced Trajan to march north, recognising that he had not the
means to hold Parthia, and in this context he tried to set up, unsuccessfully, a Roman nominee
(Parthamaspates) as a client king of Parthia.(149) On his return, having reached Selinus in Cicilia on
the coast of Asia Minor, Trajan died of dropsy probably combined with a stroke, though he suspected
that he may have been poisoned.(150) Hence, 'Trajan's coins with the slogans "Parthia capta" and
"Rex Parthis datus" seem in part propaganda', part aspiration, and part recognition of the real
importance of the East.(151)  
His successor would totally reverse this expansionist policy. Hadrian abandoned much of the territory
east of the Euphrates, at the same time stabilising revolts in the east and establishing strong defensive
lines in Syria. He withdrew Roman forces and garrisons from Armenia, Mesopotamia and Parthia, the
last of which he now allowed to have its own king, rather than the Roman puppet Trajan had tried to 
establish in Ctesiphon, though Rome kept control of parts of Arabia.(152) The Roman empire was at
its greatest extent under Trajan, but this was a case of imperial over-reach, since 'territorial 
acquisition' thereafter was rarely permanent and tended to form part of 'unrealised projects'.(153) In
part this was a return the idea of the pragmatic limits for the empire in the east, as suggested late in
the reign of Augustus, especially after setbacks on the German frontier.(154) 
A tactical change in military organisation allowed the Romans to reconsider conflict with the
Parthians. When the Romans developed their own contingents of heavily armed cavalry, they could
more easily go on to challenge Parthia again in A.D. 162-3, though it is not certain that they had 
mastered the wider strategic needs of 'desert warfare' as mobility on a grand scale.(155) Once again
Roman forces were unable to hold what they conquered due to manpower shortages, exacerbated by
renewed pressure on the Danube frontier.(156) Hence the campaigns of the emperor Lucius Verus
made initial advances between A.D. 163 and 165, with Ctesiphon (and the royal palace) being
captured, but in the end the Romans had to turn back, partly because of an epidemic which crippled
their forces.(157) These campaigns did not immediately change the strategic balance among the two
empires, though there may have been some disruption to the Parthian economy through A.D. 165-
200.(158) Septimius Severus, too, undertook major wars against rival military leaders, as well as
continuing wars against the Parthians, e.g. campaigns in A.D. 196 which led to the fall of Ctesiphon
in the next year, thereby taking the title of Parthicus Maximus in 198, just as Trajan had before him.
(159) However, Severus could not hold the Parthian capital, nor capture Hatra,(160) and had to return
to Syria. Circa 198-199 Septimius proceeded to reorganise the eastern frontiers, and engaged in a
phase of military construction, especially via a chain of forts controlling Wadi Sirhan, running from
Jordan into Arabia.(161) His control of northern Mesopotamia would for a time limit Parthian
regional influence, but "the legacy of Severus' annexation of Mesopotamia was constant and costly
war."(162) 
In later years, the succeeding Sasanian dynasty from 230 A.D. onwards managed to emerge as an
even stronger threat,(163) drawing on the Parthian geo-strategic legacy: -
Artabanus V was twice victorious over the Emperor Macrinus and imposed a heavy tribute on
Rome. Iran re-established its frontiers on the Euphrates and a Parthian invasion seemed only a 
matter of time. Thus after two and a half centuries, Roman attempts to reduce Iran to vassalage
had ended in failure. The victories of Artabanus V seemed to herald a new era of Iranian
expansion towards the West. But this was not to be achieved by the Arsacid dynasty, which
proved incapable of expanding their power beyond that of the national framework. It was the
Sassanians who, profiting from the favourable circumstances created by the Parthians, had their
revenge on Rome and carried the arms of Iran to the shores of the Mediterranean.(164)  
The Calibration of Roman Politics in the Light of the Eastern Frontier 
We can see the political effects in Rome of viewing Parthia as a great opposing power, an image
which could influence politics within Rome from the late Republic onwards. Earlier Roman thought
was negatively shaped by their own earlier negative experience of kingship and the image of despotic
'eastern' kings: thus Julius Caesar tried to avoid being called a king, that is, rex, unlike powerful titles 
with a republican precedent such as dictator. Did Julius Caesar really desire the crown, perhaps
following the type of one of his heroes, Alexander the Great, and therefore using the offer of the
crown as a way to test the mood of the People of Rome?(165) Or, was Mark Antony's offer merely a
charade designed to allow Caesar to refuse it again, thereby undermining the propaganda of his
enemies? To have refused a crown offered by a fellow consul could only have added to his prestige,
and undercut the meanness of the attacks made by his opponents. This last explanation seems likely:
to declare himself king would have been to fly in the face of centuries of tradition, and hardened
resistance to him by many elements in the state and by elite competitors utilising the plea of libertas, 
a term indicating not freedom for all but the freedom for elite groups to compete and hold high office.
(166) Furthermore, Caesar had his refusal recorded in the Fasti, the official records of magistrates,
(167) once again a clever move in the war of words over his unusual pre-eminence. At the time a 
rumour had been circulated, derived supposedly from a Sibylline oracle, that the Parthians could only
be defeated by a king - it was in this period that Caesar was contemplating a major eastern campaign.
(168) Caesar may have wished to diffuse such rumours.(168)  
The main difference between a king and a dictator or princeps was that a king would usually seek to 
found a dynasty, directly handing on power to a son or nearest relative. There is no evidence in
Caesar's will, or the political arrangements he made for his adopted nephew, Octavian, that he
intended to hand such power directly over to his descendant,(170) though no doubt he hoped for the
continued high prestige of his family and those associated with him. That Octavian would be able to
transform himself into a first among peers and be able to found an imperial line (as Augustus) was
due to a complex erosion of public life through the late republic, and the intense public weariness
with unending civil wars. Even his successor, Tiberius, would have to pretend to have leadership
thrust upon him: he was technically offered enduring 'republican' powers by the Senate, imperium as 
extended political power but not kingship. Roman rulers for generations to come could not afford to
appear as Persian or Parthian despots, though their domination of political life was almost as great.  
Furthermore, the ritual of the Roman empire would come to parallel much of the bureaucratic and
ceremonial procedure associated with eastern courts, adding a sense of distance between the emperor
and what were becoming his subjects, as distinct from co-citizens.(171) One of the clearest early 
examples of this was the 'orientalized ceremony' in which the emperor Nero crowned the Parthian
'nominee' to the Armenian crown, though this was followed by Roman ritual 'of the closing of the
temple of Janus as a sign of the establishment of peace.'(172) Likewise, luxurious and lavish imperial
courts, e.g. under Constantine I and Constantius might come under criticism as 'orientalizing' and
corrupt.(173) In later centuries both the Roman and Sasanian governments sought to move towards
more centralised and autocratic government, with the Sasanids having tighter control of their vassal
states and sub-regions.(174) The Sasanid court, in particular, seems to have over time developed an
extended protocol and 'social stratification', though at first, in theory at least, even the poorest subjects
could seek justice from the king, and it would only develop a complete bureaucracy in later times.
(175) By the fifth century the Sasanian empire had developed important official posts the divided
administrative workloads, with a proliferation of posts and honours.(176) On this basis, from Sasanid
times, books of rules or propriety (A'in-namag), dealing with protocol and conduct, were an aspect of
Persian ruling culture, leading onto the later 'mirrors for princes' by 11th century writers.(177) 
Were these accommodations between the two powers driven in part by systemic or geo-political 
limits to the expansion of the Roman empire? Partial barriers such as the Elbe, Danube and Euphrates
Rivers had a real but only temporary impact on this issue. The attempt to expand northwards into
Europe, and eastwards against Parthia, suffered from excessive resource loads, in part met by frontier
provinces, and dangerously extended lines of supply. The Romans were able to build roads and forts,
and logistically to support attacks deep into enemy territory, as is shown by the ability of the emperor
Trajan to sack Ctesiphon, the capital of the Parthians, in the early second century A.D. Likewise, the
emperors Marcus Aurelius and Septimius Severus would show that during the second century A.D.
Roman forces would be able to defeat the Parthians in set battles.(178) But such expeditions required
the mustering of huge forces, thereby weakening other major fronts. Likewise, such expeditions took
time: a commander or emperor might expect to spend a minimum of two years to effectively
campaign against Parthia. The issue here is not the 'dispersed' nature of Parthian patterns of
habitation, with few major cities,(179) nor their indeed decentralised political structure,(180) but
rather the political risk of such campaigns. Being out of touch with Rome and its politics for even a
year was a dangerous exercise in trust or remote control. Logistically, too, Rome remained an empire
centred on the Mediterranean with limited continental expansion through Gaul, southern Germany,
the Balkans and Anatolia.(181) This problem would be moderated but not solved by the setting up of
the second imperial capital of Constantinople in the early fourth century. 
Why, then, were these major eastern campaigns still conducted in the imperial period? A man like
Crassus might need to build his image, using glory to enhance his authority (auctoritas) with major 
military triumphs,(182) but once the empire came under the control of Princeps and Emperors, the 
need for such boosts to prestige was somewhat reduced. Even the emperor Julian (the Apostate)
hoped to add the title of Parthicus to his name,(183) thereby indicating his conquest of that uniquely
powerful foe (see further below). Limited wars against the Germans and Parthians were often viewed
as pre-emptive or re-active, e.g. to ensure that Roman frontiers or security. Indeed, Roman
perceptions were conditioned by the kinds of threats that the Republic had suffered from or
neutralised, e.g. powerful tribal federations invading Gaul and Italy, or the threats posed by an
overpowerful Carthage or Macedonia. Once Rome controlled an empire of provinces focused on the
Mediterranean, its vision of defence could never be passive: - 
Ever since the time of Augustus one of the cardinal principles of Roman frontier policy had been
that any organized or hostile peoples just beyond the frontier line must either be laid low by force
or disrupted by diplomacy at the first opportunity.(184)  
As such, these campaigns were usually presented in Roman sources as defensive, and pretexted on
'just causes', therefore placing a moral and legal burden on the Parthians as the source of conflict and
disorder.(185) In such a scheme of justification, the negative traits of the Parthians and their kings
would have to be emphasised. Thus Julian in his satirical piece The Caesars would have the voice of 
Trajan justify expeditions of conquest thus: - 
Against the Parthians I thought I ought not to employ force until they had put themselves in the
wrong, but when they did so I marched against them, undeterred by my age, though the laws
would have allowed me to quit the service.(186) 
In these wars of regional control Rome was relatively effective, but wars of invasion or conquest
leading deep into Mesopotamia were of a different order, representing the hope of a great triumph but
entailing substantial risk. As such, Parthia and the following Sasanid house for over four centuries
were the supreme balancers in the east, setting the horizon of Roman power and moderating her trade
flows further east. It not surprising that Ammianus Marcellinus spoke of the Persians and their allies
as 'countless peoples, who had gathered together over a long period to set the Roman world ablaze'.
(187) 
Rome could not commit the needed resources, financial and military, to directly occupy the Parthian
and Persian heartlands for any length of time. Indeed, though Roman expansion did bring new allies
and provinces under its control, it also brought about a paradox. We find that from the late Republic
onwards Italian manpower soon became insufficient, and indeed unwilling, to shoulder the burden of
such wars.(188) Rome became more dependant on Gallic sources of manpower, first extending
citizenship to regions of southern Gaul in the late 1st century B.C., while by the time of the emperor
Claudius we find Gauls attaining the rank of Equites (Knights), then selected men entering the Roman
Senate and thereby creating a tier of Gallic senators. As its domain was extended, Rome's support
base had to broaden and become more inclusive. This is the start of a centrifugal development which
would result in later years with a Senate stocked by Africans, Greeks, Syrians and eventually even
Egyptians (viewed by Romans as particularly unruly); all speaking Latin and Greek, but now with
interests much wider than the confines of the urbs Romana, Italia or even the Mediterranean world.
(189) At the same time, financial and social pressures made it difficult to support armies maintained
for decades on major frontiers in an economic system that knew much about extracting resources
through taxes, tribute and primary resources, but little about harnessing new forms of production or
social capital.  
This meant that shifts of power across the border could rapidly change the balance of forces between
Rome her neighbours. A major renewal of the 'eastern' threat was thus driven by the replacement of
the Arsacid dynasty of Parthia with the more aggressive Sasanid house of Iran taking leadership in the
east when King Ardashir was crowned King of Kings in 226 A.D.(109) The early Sasanians aimed at
seizing a vast empire, in part based on 'cultural as well as political aggrandizement in imitation of the
past', as indicated by the rock reliefs and inscriptions at Naqsh-i Rustam.(191) Adashir and then his 
son Shapur I managed to capture many pro-Roman towns, and for a time occupied Antioch: in
general, the frontier between the two empires had now shifted some 500 miles westwards.(192) The
Persians subjected the Romans to another major defeat, partly due to Roman imperial intrigues, in
A.D. 244 when Gordian III died during 'an abortive invasion along the upper Euphrates'.(193)  
The problem for Rome of a 'shallow' eastern frontier remained during the third century. As well as
problems on the Persian frontier, a great plague also disturbed the Balkans and North Africa during
the 250's. In 259 the emperor Valerian was able to relieve the Persian pressure on Antioch, but at
Edessa his army was encircled, with one of the greatest military losses in Roman history, while
Valerian himself was captured and tortured,(194) an unbelievable calamity for Roman prestige. It is
in this context that Shapur I became viewed as an empire builder, and as a quintessential 'enemy of
Rome', having defeated the emperors Gordian, Philip and Valerian.(195) Roman control of
Mesopotamia was lost, only to be regained after the incursion of the Emperor Carus in 283 A.D.,
leading to new peace agreements.(196) 
Military capabilities began to improve for the Roman Empire with Diocletian's economic and
administrative reforms of the late third century.(197) Diocletian soon revealed himself as a competent
and inventive ruler. His first step was to raise a military colleague, Maximian, to the status of Caesar,
thereby broadening his own support base. Shortly after he elevated him to the equal rank of Augustus,
creating a dual imperial system. But Diocletian went further than this in seeking stability for the
empire. In 293 A.D. he and Maximian appointed two Caesars to help them in their rule, Constantius I
and Galerius, who would assist their superior colleagues, and help rule the far reaches of empire.(198)
Diocletian, for example, would use Nicomedia in Bithynia and, later on, Antioch in Syria as his
regional capitals, thereby keeping an attentive eye on the Persian frontier.(199) He also sought to
stabilise the eastern frontier through 'defences in depth', including a system of fortifications and
fortresses such as Cercusium on the Euphrates.(200) It would also allow coordinated activities by
more than one supreme commander, e.g. the invasion of Narses was in part curtailed through the
actions of Diocletian defence of the frontier Syria and later on Galerius' aggressive northern march
via Armenia.(201) For a time, Diocletian was able to stabilise the eastern frontier to Rome's
advantage, establishing a peace that would last forty years,(202) but this would not continue through
the next century. As part of this settlement trade between the Roman and Persian zones was to be
routed through the city of Nisibis alone, indicating Roman desires to control the frontier and perhaps
to curb the infiltration of spies.(203) 
During the early fourth century upper Mesopotamia had come again under Roman control, largely
due to Galerius' military successes,(204) but this did not lead to a stable frontier: - 
By that time the Parthian Empire which had confronted Rome across the Euphrates in the first
two centuries had been replaced by a Persian Empire in the 220s, and northern Mesopotamia
had become an endlessly contested battleground between the two powers. Roman direct rule
had been substituted for a whole series of dependent kingdoms, among them Judaea,
Commagene, Emesa, Nabataea and Osrhoene.(205)  
The burden of military costs was high when combined with a system of elites that needed to extract
wealth to maintain prestige, demonstrate symbolic power through maintaining clients and public
duties, and build political careers. In total effect, the Roman economy had been heading for some
time away from a relatively uncontrolled market towards a planned economy: Diocletian's reforms,
and the need for the empire to support a huge military structure against growing external threats,
moved it in the direction of a 'command economy', an effective but not permanent solution.(206) In
doing so, it stifled much of the vigour of its great trading cities (especially in the east), which had
become huge cosmopolitan centres during the Hellenistic Age and the early Roman period (330 B.C.
- A.D. 100), thereby in part reducing the long-term social stability of the eastern parts of the empire in
following centuries.  
However, the Roman empire during the third and fourth centuries A.D. was still in superficial ways
very strong. Thus, Rome managed once again to push its frontier zone east of the Euphrates: - 
. . . Roman control had extended across the Euphrates, to cover the whole of the shelf which lies
between the Taurus Mountains and the Mesopotamian plain proper, finally to reach the Tigris.
South of the shelf, or of the Jebel Sinjar which marks its southern edge in the east, it was only for
a brief period in the third century that Roman forces found themselves stationed at the city of
Hatra, the capital of a small kingdom which had formed part of the Parthian Empire. So far as we
know, Hatra was never to be Roman again after its capture by Shapur I in about 240. As regards
the eastern part of the shelf, lying south of Mons Masius, an outlying spur of the Taurus (the Tur
Abdin, later to be the heartland of Syriac monasticism), and including the city of Nisibis, Roman
dominance was to be enshrined in the treaty with Persia in 298 or 299, only to be surrendered
forever after the defeat and death of Julian in 363. Thereafter, the zone where Syriac Christianity
flourished was to be divided, west of Nisibis, by the frontier between the two empires. Between
the two treaties, of 298/299 and 363, however, the Roman military presence had also extended
north of Mons Masius to take in an even less known area: the plain between the mountain and
the Tigris, along the stretch where the river, on leaving the main Taurus range, turns almost due
east, before swinging south round the end of Mons Masius past the eventual Roman fort of
Bezabde to enter the north-east corner of the Mesopotamian plain. It was on this stretch of the
Tigris, just before it turns east, that in the 330s Constantius, as 'Caesar' under his father
Constantine, was to fortify the city of Amida (Diyarbakir).(207) 
Control of Armenia and Mesopotamia had for a time been achieved, in large measure through the
treaty of 299, with the extended eastern frontier being strengthened under Diocletian but remained a
tempting target for Persian counter-claims.(208)  
Imperial ambition could still upset the architecture of Roman dominance in the Near East. In 356
A.D. the young Julian won a strong victory over the Germans in a battle near Strasbourg,
strengthening his credentials as a military commander, and winning eventual proclamation by the
army as Augustus.(209) Reacting in part to Persian hostilities along the eastern frontier, to the sieges
of Nisibis, Amida and Singara, but also driven by personal ambition, Julian invaded Persian
territories.(210) Pragmatically, it is also possible that Julian needed such victories to detract from
strong Christian apposition to his hellenizing ('pagan') religious policies, and his growing
unpopularity in Antioch, based in part on his inability to reform or revitalise municipal senates in
order to deal with famine and inflation that continued in spite of his intervention.(211) 
These military operations are hard to view as purely defensive in nature, though they are caste in part
as punitive and pre-emptive operations against an aggressive Persian king. Julian may have made
comparisons between the Persians and the historical threats posed by early enemies such as Carthage
and Veii.(212) However, Julian's own letters seem to confirm both an intent to settle the eastern
frontier as well as the desire to return as a conquering hero avenging past aggression by the Persians
(perhaps influenced by models as diverse as Alexander, Marcus Aurelius and Trajan), and we should
not dismiss the idea that he thought a long term victory was possible.(213) That he may have
entertained such ambitions is hinted at in one of his rhetoric works where he has Alexander the Great
criticise Roman claims to glory: - 
And if you think the conquest of Persia such a trifle and disparage an achievement so glorious,
tell me why, after a war of more than three hundred years, you Romans have never conquered a
small province beyond the Tigris which is still governed by the Parthians? Shall I tell you why? It
was the arrows of the Persians that check you.(214) 
Once again, however, victories on the battlefield did not equate with the ability to hold territory, and
it seems that Julian underestimated the scale and resources of the Persian Empire, which had a deeper
field of operation that his opponents on the Rhine frontier.(215) The Roman forces were forced to
evacuate, with Julian losing his life in one these battles, perhaps due to treachery among his own
followers, though this view is not directly credited by Ammianus Marcellinus.(216) High hopes had
been dashed, as indicated by Libanius: - 
The Persian empire should now lie in ruins, and Roman governors instead of satraps now be
administering their territory under our laws: our temples should here be adorned with booty got
from them, while the victor in his contest should be seated on his imperial throne, receiving the
orations composed in honour of his exploits. Such, I am sure, would be right and proper. . . . We
expected the whole empire of Persia to form part of that of Rome.(217) 
Once again a Roman emperor had lost his life in a fateful clash with the Persians. His successor,
Jovian, would have to give up five 'frontier provinces' that had been held along the Tigris River,
surrender the strong points of Nisibis and Singara, and cede dynastic influence on Armenia,
pragmatic but unpopular policies.(218)  
At this stage the Persians were a permanent thorn in the Roman side, a reminder of the real risks to
eastward expansion. At the same, it was an empire with which the Romans developed a diplomatic
protocol, an ability to forge temporary or decades-long treaties,(219) and a recognised power in the 
east, as implied by a story in Herodian whose fictive account suggests Roman recognition of the two
empires as controlling the barbarians around them.(220) These protocols included the sending of
envoys, the provision of protective escorts, the use of (at least) bilingual translators, the adoption of
written Greek as the language of regional communication, the use, or intentional misuse, of titles in
correspondence, as well as formal meetings on bridges of boats that spanned the Euphrates
(symbolising an equality of meeting at the frontier), as well as shared feasts.(221) Thus, when such
protocol was breached, it was well understood as an aggressive move and not just a breakdown of
diplomacy.(222) 
These traditions continued through the Byzantine period. On this basis the borders between the
empires were at times regulated by mutual recognition of the real power of both.(223) By the late 6th
century, it emerged that both Byzantium and Persia 'suffered from constant warfare with no decisive
advantage to either'.(224) This could even lead to some areas of mutual cooperation, e.g. under
Shapur III the defence of the northern passes over the Caucasus became crucial due to 'nomad'
invaders threatening both Persian and Byzantine interests. On this basis Byzantium at times shared
the expenses of protecting this region and maintaining the Darband defences, though the withholding
of these funds would cause renewed tensions in the early 6th century.(225) Indeed, by A.D. 540 
Khusrau I again invaded the Roman Empire, claiming that the emperor Justinian had provoked the
Huns into attacking Parthia.(226) However, in the long run the halting of the Huns in the Caucasus
'merely deflected them around the Black Sea to the Roman West'.(227)
Likewise, both sides could engage in mutually understood diplomacy and treaty processes, e.g. the
detailed treaties of 298/299 and 561 A.D. in particular.(228) By this stage elaborate diplomatic
protocols and bilingual interpreters had been developed between these two powers.(229) The borders
between the two empires would tend to become more rigid between 387 and 536, with most
autonomous buffer or median states being absorbed or directly controlled.(230) Underneath these
courtesies and de facto recognition of a regional balance of power, there probably remained 'a deep
vein of enmity' and perhaps even 'mutual contempt' (231) based on religious and cultural differences.
However, in the long run the contest for power ultimately weakened both, and helped provide the
regional conditions for sweeping Arab victories from A.D. 636 down till 651, when the Sasanian
empire fell.(232) 
Frontier Trading Cities and Transnational Religious Flows 
The Parthian and subsequent Persian dynasties were more than just 'strategic competitors' on the
frontier for Rome expansion. They also resurrected the problem of religious tolerance and minorities
across both empires, whereby Jews, Manichees and Christians were part of the equation of relations
between these empires. Intolerance became even more the norm in Roman governance once it became
a Christian empire. In turn, within the Persian zone Christians, with their allegiances turned towards
Rome, Byzantium or a wavering Armenia, might be viewed with suspicion.(233) In general terms it is
true to say the Parthians were more tolerant than the Sasanians in religious affairs, in part because
Adashir in setting up the Sasanids dynasty as 'King of kings' may have used religious claims to
bolster his 'right by conquest',(234) though individual rulers would vary greatly in these policies.
However, the dynamism and wealth of the East had continued appeal: 'Western influence . . . trickled
in - forerunners of the flood of Christian artisans, builders, silk weavers, and visiting philosophers,
who would be drawn to Mesopotamia as the shadow of the Sasanian kings lengthened across the Near
East.'(235) These problems would thus today be called transnational problems,(236) with cultural,
religious and migration flowing across military borders in a way that would be viewed as a definite
security threat for imperial systems jealous of alternative sources of authority.  
We can thus note that in Ammianus Marcellinus' account, concerned with Julian's campaigns against
Persia, we do hear of defectors, deserters, spies, false intelligence and ordinary people operating out
of self-interest 'to cross the line' and help the opposing empire.(237) Likewise, in later centuries
prisoner transportations, population exchanges, deportation of skilled workmen, and voluntary
movements of artisans and mercenaries did occur across these border lands.(238) These transnational
flows, combined with the role of border kingdoms and cities that formed the conduit for trade,
generated not just real knowledge, but also images and fears of defection, deceit, and instability that
would shape Roman images of a near east that was full of both opportunities and dangers (see further
below). 
In this setting, Jewish populations would come to find themselves squeezed between Roman and
Persian spheres of interest, a factor of some concern with sizeable Jewish minorities located under
Parthian control.(239) Thus, when populations in Palestine came to be disenchanted with Roman
domination, they were viewed as a potential fifth column that might welcome a change of rule.
During the third century A.D. a number of rabbis came to interpret Biblical prophecies as pointing to
the immanent fall of the Roman empire, a messianic expectation that would draw official suspicion.
(240) In turn, Jewish populations in Seleucia and Babylon were at times 'disenchanted with Parthian
rule'.(241) In the first three centuries of the current era their fate was a complex mix of cooperation
and suppression, while from the second century a Jewish exilarch had civil authority recognised by
the Parthian government.(242) Speaking of events before 226 A.D., Neusner suggests: - 
The evidence is . . . that the Jews in Babylonia lived in relatively close contact, both physical and
cultural, with their neighbours. Their main center, Nehardea, was not far from the great Hellenistic
city, Seleucia on the Tigris; and in any case, Greeks, Babylonians, Pagan Semites, Jews and
Parthians inhabited the narrow strip of fertile land around the Royal Canal which later historians
so generously assigned to the Jews alone. We know, for example, that in the first century, when
the Jewish barony of Anileus and Asineus was established, the local Greeks and Babylonians
opposed it and eventually succeeded in gaining Parthian support to destroy it, but that, for a time,
the two brothers ruled both Jewish and Hellenistic and Babylonian populations, all in a relatively
small area around, but apparently not including Nehardea itself. . . . Furthermore, the Greek city
of Seleucia contained a Hellenized Jewish population.(243) 
It is in this context of the political affiliation of religious groups, particularly against sects regarded as
intrusive and perhaps anti-Roman, that a general sacrifice was ordered within the Roman empire for
306 A.D.(244) Governors could order people to make sacrifice before an image of the emperor,
thereby testing their loyalty. It was likely that the main targets were in the army and administration, as
well as prominent leaders of city communities. This test of loyalty may not have been directed at
Christianity alone, but at the Manichean sect, whose members were suspected of holding allegiance to
the Persian empire. It is possible in the previous century that King Narses' support for Mani and his
missionary activity contained a distinct 'anti-Roman' element, with the Manichean influence being
blamed in fanning a major revolt in Egypt.(245) The then Emperor Diocletian had instructed that the
Manichean creed 'of the Persians' be completely suppressed.(246) Here trans-regional religious cults 
were one focus of perceived threats in a deepened contest among sources of social and political
authority. 
Once the Roman empire had become Christianised, Christians and Manichees within the Persian zone
of influence would come under alternating pressures from Zoroastrianism and then Islam.(247) The
first Sasanid king, Ardeshir I (also called Artaxerxes in some sources) came from a line of 'of high-
priests who were hereditary guardians of the great temple at Istakhr in southern Iran', giving his line a
religious foundation.(248) The first 'great persecution' of Christians occurred under the Sasanid king
Shapur II, beginning in 339, and in part reacting to the progressive Christianisation of the Roman
Empire after Constantine.(249) Churches affiliated with Rome, Constantinople and Antioch would
come under suspicion, but once 'Nestorianism had been condemned and Nestorians were seeking
refuge in Persia' this pattern would begin to change.(250) The 'Persian' Church firmly broke away
from Antioch's affiliation sometime after 422-424 A.D., electing their own 'Catholicus' with his seat
in Ctesiphon, where its synods were held, though Edessa had been a major training centre in its early
phase, with this role declining between 457 and 489 A.D.(251) Thereafter the 'Nestorian' Church, as
an independent group with different doctrines from the west emerged from 483-484 A.D. onwards, 
with Nestorian doctrines firmly entrenched by 497 A.D.(252) Sasanid tolerance was largely based on
political realisations: - 
The Sassanid dynasty continued in power, and was, on the whole, tolerant. This was because it
was recognized that the Church in Persia was alienated form the Church of the Roman Empire,
and it was considered more prudent to make Christians within the Persian Empire feel secure
within their national boundaries, rather than to encourage them to look to their co-religionists 
across the border.(253) 
The Nestorian Church would come under partial Sasanid protection, with a phase of persecution
during Chosroe I's (also transliterated as Khosrow or Khusrau) conflict with the Roman Empire (540-
545 A.D.) and again under Chosroes II from 608 down till 628 A.D. It thereafter extended its
activities as far eastwards as Mongolia, India and China.(254)  
Trade was the other major driver of transnational flows of goods, information, and people across the
Near East. Roman and Hellenistic interests in the region were not entirely strategic and political.
Trade routes across Arabia, Egypt, and onto the Indian Ocean were also of considerable importance.
Parthia, in effect, became one of the links in east-west trade, for about 115 B.C. 'Mithridates [II of 
Parthia] received an embassy from the Emperor of China, and the two rulers concluded a treaty
designed to facilitate the movement of international commerce in which Iran, as a transit state, formed
a vitally important link.'(255) Parthian coins have been found in the Caucasus, the Volga region, and
even in eastern Turkestan, indicating extensive trade networks reaching from Dura Europos (Syria) to
Merv (Turkmenistan), while the Parthians also had a share in trade flows from India.(256) However,
from the first century A.D. onwards, new enemies in the east helped open Roman trade routes that in
part bypassed Parthia: - 
Rome's interest in the region went beyond the matter of imperial glory for its own sake. At issue
were significant economic interests as well. In the middle of the first century, the Kushans, a
group belonging to the confederation of the Yueh-chi or Tokhari, under their king Kujula 
Kadphises, came south out of Central Asia and occupied Bactria, apparently seized Merv from
the Parthians, and established the Kushan frontier at Hyrcania. Thus, when Hyrcania, with the
Kushans on its northern and eastern flanks, attempted to break away from Parthia and assert its
independence in 58 [A.D.], this provided Rome with the opportunity, by means of an alliance with
Hyrcania, to establish an important trade route to China and India. Goods from the east were now
able to pass down the Oxus, cross the Caspian Sea, and connect with the Black Sea through the
Cyrus River, without the need to cross Parthian territory at any point.(257)  
The later (Persian) Sasanian dynasty, too, was interested in controlling and benefiting from the trade
that flowed from India and the eastern region to Byzantine markets, and seems to have raised the
price of prestige items flowing westwards by adding high taxes, while its merchants came to largely
dominate trade flows in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, as well as buying up major cargoes in some
Indian ports.(258)  
Likewise, the desert regions of Mesopotamia, Syria and Arabia were not merely partial barriers, for
like 'a sea, the desert nourished border towns, the meeting places of caravans and people.'(259) Thus
we can speak of a shifting network of 'caravan cities' such as Dura Europos (a fort as much as a trade
centre) and Palmyra that were also conduits of cultural and religious diversity amid the shifting
frontiers of these great empires.(260) This cultural and religious diversity also would have long-term 
political implications in relation to the power of the centre. Religion and cult formed one of the major
flows along routes of trade and conquest, with flow-on effects for cultural identity and political 
control, including official Roman adoption of Christianity: - 
During the period of Roman hegemony such self-definition offered the scope for a culture within a 
culture, a space for initiates (in the context of religion), which need not resist the dominating
power but which - if the circumstances arose - might do so. Moreover, within the broad grip of 
imperial control, the various local religions of the empire were tolerated and encouraged to
compete. Such competition (which we will observe in the case of Dura Europos) was a very
effective form of "segmentary opposition", which the Empire had every reason to encourage on
the sound hegemonic principle of "divide and rule." But it engendered in the various competing
religions an element of resistance to each other - of self-definition by polemic against other cults 
and by reversal of other cults' practices. The risk, from the dominating state's point of view, in
such a system (as it had developed by the third century C.E.) was that it needed a very small
step for a cult to move from resisting the others to resisting the center (in the form of the imperial
cult, for instance). This was always something that was potentially possible. Nothing proves the
power of the cults as a means of engendering a strong sense of cultural identity among their
followers so much as the state's decision under Constantine to harness one of the most eccentric
to its own bandwagon as the new state religion.(261) 
In turn, the region of Mesopotamia was itself a zone of great cultural diversity and religious creativity
in the third century: - 
In the small region, a parallelogram of no more than 200 miles in length and 50 in breadth, we
find the following: first, and most important, the resurgence of a conquering, proselytizing
Mazdeism, propagated by the state under Ardashir, and established (if in a tolerant manner) as
the state religion under Shahpuhr with its exponent Kartir; second, the development of an Iranian
gnostic syncretism by the prophet Mani, who, at the time of the redecoration of the Dura
synagogue, proclaimed a new religion and in the next decades attracted a wide following in Iran
and in the Roman Empire as well; third, the advance of Christianity (Mani's father was probably a
Christian, and Jesus played a part in his theology) into the Mesopotamian valley from Edessa,
where, by 201, it had become well established; fourth the great expansion of cults within the
Iranian idiom, in particular, Mithraism, in both Iran and the Roman Empire, to the point where
Mithraism was perhaps the single most popular religion on the Roman side of the frontier; fifth,
and by no means least, the beginnings of a revolution in Babylonian Judaism, which transformed
the earlier indigenous religion into a fair representation of the ideas of the Palestinian Tannaim . .
. and which must have created a tremendous upheaval in Babylonian Jewry. These events, each
of them of lasting importance in the religious life of Mesopotamia, took place within a brief period;
one may say that from circa 220 to circa 250 in Babylonia Manichaeism, Rabbinic Judaism and 
Mazdeism were all taking form.(262)
In part, such changes were diffused along existing trade and cultural networks. Dura Europos, initially
a Hellenistic fortress established by Nicanor, a general of Seleucus I, was on the line of two caravan
routes, one passing from Seleucia (later on Ctesiphon) up the Euphrates towards Antioch, and other
westward route across the desert to Palmyra.(263) Dura was initially controlled by Macedonians, next
by the Parthians from circa 113 B.C., and then captured by the Romans permanently in A.D. 164 (for
whom it was a key frontier town), and thereafter for a shorter time it was seized by the Sasanian
Persians.(264) If in general terms it was more influenced by Parthian than Roman culture, it was also
a diverse meeting point for a wide range of regional influences, including Jewish, Mesopotamian,
Greek, and Iranian.(265) It used Greek, Aramaic, Palmyrene (as a local dialect), Latin, Hebrew and
the Pahlavi alphabet for different purposes, while within one family Greek, Roman, and Parthian
names might be found.(266) As noted by Rostovtzeff: - 
When Septimius Severus raised Dura to the rank of a colony many of them became Roman
citizens (as did their Palmyrene companions) and assumed the name of Septimius. But they were
neither true Romans nor true Greeks, although their ancestors had certainly been Graeco-
Macedonian colonists. Their nationality is impossible to determine and, in one and the same
family, the father will bear a Greek name, the wife a Semitic, and the children Greek, Iranian, or
Semitic names.(267) 
Dura had at least five major temples, a synagogue with fine wall paintings, a strong fort and citadel,
and thick walls on the three sides not bounded by the river.(268) In part, it guarded the major caravan
routes, and at other times was an important frontier fort basing Roman soldiers.(269) Even as its role
as a caravan centre may have declined through the early third century A.D., it is likely that it
continued to collect customs dues from those crossing into the Roman frontier region.(270) The city
was finally captured by the Sasanians circa A.D. 253 and destroyed in 256, perhaps in response to a
revolt against Persian control.(271)  
Palmyra, initially probably known as Tadmor and part of early Syrian caravan routes from Assyrian
times, became a partly Hellenised city which was much more important during Roman engagement of
the Near East.(272) Palmyra flourished on the long-distance trade linking Rome with eastern luxuries: 
- 
Its sudden growth to the size of one of he largest towns in the East coincides with the moment in
history when the demand for oriental luxuries began to grow in Rome and its dominians, and it
was due to the clever policy of its merchants and camel-drivers who knew how to keep order in 
the desert between their town and the great factories and warehouses of Lower Mesopotamia.
From that time caravans were able to cross the Syrian desert instead of skirting it, and the transit
brought huge profits to the Palmyrenes.(273) 
Palmyra would come to exhibit Semitic, Aramaic, Babylonian, Greek, Parthian (especially in artistic
conventions), Iranian and Roman elements in its language, culture and administrative structures,
clearly indicating its east-west linkages across key trade routes.(274) It had a large caravanserai, as
well as temples of Bel, Arsu and Azizu.(275) The long periods of relative peace between Rome and
Parthia allowed Palmyra to flourish as a caravan city that hosted a network of expatriate trading
communities stretching from the Mediterranean deep into the Parthian empire and as far as India, with
its merchants also owning ships in 'both Roman and Parthian ports'.(276) Palmyra would evolve from
a prosperous caravan city to virtual autonomy, followed by a final effort to set itself up as a powerful
and independent kingdom under Odenath and Zenobia, leading to its eventual crushing by Roman
forces in A.D. 272, reducing it to 'little more than a cross-road oasis', with trade diverted in part to 
Aleppo and Chalcis.(277) 
Other trade and 'border' cities, small states and fortified cities acted as conduits for trade and cultural
contact. These included at various times: Edessa (used for a time by emperor Constantius as his
'forward headquarters, later on the centre of the independent kingdom of Osrhoene), nearby
Commagene, Petra, Nisibis (a key strategic fortified city more important in trading terms after the
destruction of Palmyra), Amida, Gerasa (Jerash), Singara (heavily fortified by the Romans), Carrhae
(Harran), Callinicum (Raqqa, a trade centre), Gordyene and Hatra, which had been heavily fortified
by the Parthians.(278) More widely, Merv, Petra, Zeugma, Antioch, Seleucia-on-the-Tigris, and 
Damascus formed part of extensive east-west trade networks.(279) 
The Characterisation of Parthian and Persian Power 
The Romans only gradually recognised the real power of the Parthians, at first admitting their military
prowess but arguing that they lacked the good governance needed to hold and occupy Roman territory
for any more than a short period.(280) In part, such negative projections were drawn as opposites to
the Roman view of themselves as pre-eminently suited to the art of government.(281) By the end of
the third century these comforting stereotypes had come under increasing pressure but had not been
overcome. In 299, when the victorious Diocletian and Galerius were negotiating terms with the
Persians, the King's minister, Apharban, apparently suggested that 'The Roman and Persian
monarchies . . . are the twin eyes of the world, and it would be a sad disfigurement if either of them
were ever put out.'(282)  
The Romans were less inclined to be generous. During the fourth century the Persians were viewed
with a grudging admiration as strong and usually disciplined warriors, but were also judged as
addicted to stratagem and secrecy.(283) Julian's motivations for his eastern campaign were given as
'knowing from experience as well as report that for almost sixty years this fierce people had stamped
cruel evidence of carnage and rapine upon the East and had often utterly annihilated our armies'.(284)
In the rhetorical speech put in Julian's mouth in the history of Ammianus Marcellinus we find the
Persians referred to as a 'pernicious people' lifted to the level of Carthage as a grand enemy of Rome,
while elsewhere Julian speaks of their 'power and arrogance'.(285) Their King was addicted to the
'delights of rapine.' and described as the 'most merciless of men' and as that 'monster of guile'.(286)
Julian himself would praise Constantius in the following terms, conflating the current Persian dynasty
with the Parthians: - 
You often crossed the Tigris with your army and spent a long time in the enemy's country, but
you always returned crowned with the laurels of victory. Then you visited the cities you had freed,
and bestowed on them peace and plenty, all possible blessings and all at once. Thus at your
hands they received what they had so long desired, the defeat of the barbarians and the erection
of trophies of victory over the treachery and cowardice of the Parthians. Treachery they had
displayed when they violated the treaties and broke the peace, cowardice when they lacked the
courage to fight for their country and all that they held dear.(287) 
The Persians were also viewed as 'wallowing in wealth', while Persian women, we are told, were
'renowned for their beauty'.(288) The men, too, were noted for their vanity and the nobles 'frequently
used cosmetics and painted their faces, and all ranks wore long beards and often had their tonsure
dressed in curls or otherwise elaborately styled.'(289) The Roman image of Persian indulgence is
recorded in detail by Ammianus Marcellinus: - 
Most Persians are inordinately addicted to the pleasures of sex, and find even a large number of
concubines hardly enough to satisfy them; they do not practise pederasty. A man has many or
few wives according to his means, and his affections, being divided between a number of objects,
is lukewarm. The luxury of an elegant table and especially indulgence in drink they shun like the 
plague. Only the king has a set hour for dining. Apart from him every man times his meals by his
stomach. . . .  
They are full of empty words and talk madly and extravagantly. They are tiresomely and
disgustingly boastful, and given to threats whether things are going well or ill. They are cunning,
proud, and cruel, and claim the power of life and death over slaves and humble plebeians. They
flay men alive, either completely or bit by bit. No servant who waits on them at table is allowed to
open his mouth, speak, or spit; once the cloth is spread everyone's lips are sealed.(290) 
However, Ammianus could not avoid also recognising their military abilities: - 
Their military training and discipline, and their constant practice of manoeuvres and arms drill,
which I have often described, make them formidable even to large armies. They rely especially
on their cavalry in which all their mobility and men of mark serve. Their infantry are armed like
gladiators, and obey orders like soldiers' servants. . . . This nation, so bold and well exercised in
martial arts, would have set its yoke on many peoples beside those which it has fully subdued,
had it not been constantly harassed by domestic and foreign wars.(291) 
There was in reality a degree of mirroring and mutual influence across these borders. Parthian and
Persian tactics forced the Romans to develop their only heavy cavalry and extend their logistic
resources in the east, but by the third century the secure limits of imperial control and power had been
well established. Roman legions could readily invade but not hold Mesopotamia - the exploits of 
Alexander were not to be repeated by Roman emperors. Lastly, the great prestige of Parthian and
Sasanid kings in the east was one of the factors that led to the importation of elaborate court ritual
into the later Roman Empire (see further above), creating a great distance between the Emperor and
'Roman citizens', most of whom became humiliores, those who could be taxed and punished at will.
(292)  
Parthia, and then the renewed Persian Empire, would remain a powerful counter-balance, first to the 
eastern Roman Empire, then to the Byzantine Empire throughout the fifth and sixth centuries. The
eastern frontier for the Byzantine Empire continued to be a zone of alternating fragile peace and
contention: thus the Roman Emperor Justinian made a peace with Khusrau in AD 532, but in A.D.
540 Antioch was sacked, indicating another round of fragility for Rome's control of Syria, whose
countryside seems to have received 'Iranian support for the local economy and protection of the
villages'.(293) The sense of threat experienced during this period has been captured by the sixth
century historian Procopius: - 
Again, the Persians under Chosroes thrice invaded the rest of the Roman territory and razed the
cities to the ground. Of the men and women they captured in the cities that they stormed and in
the various country districts, some they butchered, others they carried away with them, leaving
the land completely uninhabited wherever they happened to swoop. And from the time when they
first invaded Colchis the destruction of Colchians, the Lazi, and the Romans has continued to this
day.(294) 
As Byzantium's power declined in the early seventh century, Khusrau II would sack Antioch,
Damascus, and Jerusalem, temporarily carrying off the Holy Cross, and for a time secured control of
most of West Asia (A.D. 611-619).(295) 
These events would give the Romans in turn a religious pretext of regaining Christian religious relics
and revenge for the sacking of Jerusalem, mobilising what Warwick Ball has termed an early 'Holy
War'.(296) Even if the counterattack under the Emperor Heraclitus would push the Sasanians out of
Asia Minor and help bring about the fall of Khusrau II and perhaps the ultimate decline of the Sasanid
throne,(297) these trends left an indelible mark on Roman and Byzantine history. Images of Persia
and Parthia would set up symbolic stereotypes of wealth, power and despotism that fuelled the
European imagination down into the early 20th century. If the pomp, circumstance and cruelty of
'oriental' courts was partly true, e.g. the luxurious court of Khusrau II in the great palace of Ctesiphon,
(298) it was also a projection of the growing reality for Roman imperial power, which could no
longer be cloaked in Republican or Hellenistic forms. Gradually Rome and then Constantinople took
on the mirage of an empire that claimed Christian and other providential symbols, but this remained
in the end an imperfect use of power, an 'Earthly' City whose authority could never be fully
legitimated by an appeal to the divine.(299)  
These images would only be partly submerged by Arabic and Islamic conquests (from 650 AD), and
the later Turkish intrusion into the region, that would set these Persian elements within a new context.
The Byzantine Empire found Persia a 'perpetual menace',(300) at least until the rise of Islam as a geo-
political force. Medieval Persia, then modern Iran, would retain the allure of a powerful and remote
empire set within a foreign political and religious context. As such, Persia was one of the many
'others' that Europeans would encounter and create as Europe discovered itself as a formation distinct
from Middle Eastern cultures.  
Cultural difference, however, does not exclude areas of commonality, as noted by Michael Seymour:
- 
As a cultural resource, heritage is variously used to build, support, or oppress cultural identities
through difference. By the same token, however, our pasts, for all their diversity, have the power
to unite and to perform a very basic and very positive function of mass culture to remind us of our
common humanity. . . . Recent generations of scholars have worked to show the value of
difference of all kinds and to establish that the world cannot be reduced to a bland homogeny, far
less one whose agenda is determined by the world's tiny socioeconomic elite. They have been
right to do so: our world histories have been guilty of prejudice on the basis of sex, gender,
ethnicity, nationality, class, religion and language. But life is not only difference. It is one thing to
be forced into a totalitarian homogenizing schema and quite another to celebrate common
ground; the latter holds the same liberating potential as the affirmation of self that is the core of
theories of difference.(301) 
This image of the Persian 'other' was tinged with exotic features and driven by an orientalist need
both to explore the 'forbidden' as well as assert, in the final analysis, European supremacy.  
Historically the gateways to appreciate Persian and Parthian culture were limited until the modern
period: these 'foreign' cultures were read through Greek, Roman, Christian or Byzantine viewpoints.
However, this did not exclude the practical development of patterns of protocol and diplomacy that
allowed these empires to communicate, if not really understand each other. Later on, Medieval Persia
and the emerging modern state of Iran would be once again seen through the lens of European geo-
political needs and the Great Game played out between Russian and English interests. This occurred
even as Iran carried forward a modified Hellenistic learning and its own unique Persian culture to
influence both the Islamic and European worlds. Ironically, the lessons of power projection in the
context of racial stereotyping across differing cultural regions was not always retained by Roman
leaders, even after centuries of bitter experience and decades of pragmatic accommodation. In the 21st
century there are even fewer excuses for failing to understand cultural frontiers as sources of threat
and misinterpretation when engaging in distant wars aimed as securing some kind of global 'peace'. 
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